Smoke, Mirrors, and ERISA: The False Illusion of Retirement Income Security by Landres, Michael Barbanell
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2007
Smoke, Mirrors, and ERISA: The False Illusion of
Retirement Income Security
Michael Barbanell Landres
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael B. Landres, Smoke, Mirrors, and ERISA: The False Illusion of Retirement Income Security, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1169 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol40/iss3/9
SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND ERISA:
THE FALSE ILLUSION OF
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
Michael Barbanell Landres*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2006, UAL Corporation ("UAL"), the parent
holding company of United Airlines, emerged from bankruptcy after
approximately three years of Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.'
As part of its reorganization plan, UAL entered into an agreement
with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC")2 to
terminate defined pension plans that the airline had legally
underfunded by almost $10 billion Pursuant to its federal mandate
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act4 ("ERISA"),
the PBGC is now liable for the pension benefits of 121,557 current
and former UAL employees?
Most of UAL's current and former employees lost significant
retirement benefits when UAL terminated its retirement plans.
While the terminated plans had provided employees with medical
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., June 2001, History
and French Studies, Stanford University. Special thanks to Professor Daniel Schechter, who
patiently advised me on this project while on sabbatical, and to Professor Lauren Willis, whose
keen intellect and passion for the law have been a source of inspiration for me throughout law
school. I also wish to thank Bruce Wu, Managing Director, Citigroup Corporate & Investment
Bank, and Valerie A. Cohen, formerly of Disney Corporate Alliances, each of whom mentored
me and helped expand my knowledge of the corporate world.
1. See Press Release, United Air Lines, Inc., United Exits Bankruptcy as a Strong
Competitor Committed to Continuous Improvement (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.united.com/
press/detail/0,6862,53625,00.html [hereinafter United Exits Bankruptcy].
2. For a detailed description of the PBGC, see infra Part III.
3. Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 91, 94
n. 1 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying flight attendants' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
PBGC from terminating the UAL pension plans).
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
5. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 94 n.1, 103.
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coverage, the PBGC offers no such benefit. Furthermore, employees
who spent their careers at UAL accepting lower wages and collective
bargaining concessions in exchange for the company's guarantee of a
defined pension benefit will now experience substantial decreases in
their monthly retirement income, some by more than 50 percent.6
The loss of employee benefits is merely the tip of the iceberg.
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has noted,
the bankruptcy of airlines with underfunded pension plans has the
potential to create a "vicious cycle" of bankruptcies and plan
terminations within the airline industry.7  Now that UAL has
emerged from Chapter 11 reorganization, the absence of its pension
obligations, combined with a reduced debt load, will greatly reduce
its costs and enable the airline to price its competitors out of the
market.8 Cognizant of this fact, Delta and Northwest have them-
selves filed for bankruptcy protection and appear to be modeling
their own reorganization plans after that of UAL; it is therefore likely
that they too will reduce labor costs by shedding their underfunded
defined benefit plans before emerging from bankruptcy protection.9
More disturbing yet, this cycle appears to have spread beyond the
airline industry. The recent demise of Delphi Automotive" and the
6. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Guarantees, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/key-
resources-for-the-press/content/pagel3542.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Pension
Guarantees]. See generally Broken Promises: The United Airlines Pension Crisis: E-Hearing
Before Reps. George Miller & Jan Schakowsky, (2005), http://webharvest.gov/congressl09th/
20061114071951/edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/pdf/pensionehearingrecord.pdf.
7. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-108T, PRIVATE PENSIONS: AIRLINE
PLANS' UNDERFUNDING ILLUSTRATES BROADER PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION SYSTEM 9 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05l08t.pdf.
8. See United Exits Bankruptcy, supra note 1. For additional information on the long-term
outlook of the airline industry, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-945,
COMMERCIAL AVIATION: BANKRUPTCY AND PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF
UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL ISSUES (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05945
.pdf.
9. Dave Carpenter, United Serving as Bankruptcy Model, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005,
at E4, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/
2002500628_airlinesunitedl 7.html ("I think they looked at United and saw how United was able
to shed pension liabilities.... United is showing that you can use bankruptcy in an intelligent
manner to restructure." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10. See Mary Williams Walsh, Whoops! There Goes Another Pension Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2005, at Cl (noting that the demise of Delphi Automotive is yet another example of an
old-line company unlocking value by jettisoning its pension obligations); see also Wharton
School of the Univ. of Pa., Underfunded Pensions: Causes, Cures and Questions,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Oct. 20, 2004, at 3, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf
.cfin?articleid=824&CFID ("While GM and other companies say they can handle the shortfall...
some people and politicians see an unsettling resemblance to the steel industry.").
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financial distress of both General Motors and Ford may indicate that
the automotive industry too will soon suffer the same fate as the
airline industry."
Based on the PBGC's most recent estimates, the nation's single-
employer defined benefit plans are currently underfunded by
approximately $450 billion."2 More troublesome yet, among com-
panies whose pension plans meet the agency's criteria for risk of
future termination, 3 the PBGC faces exposure to approximately
$108 billion in unfunded future liabilities.' 4 When combined with a
sharp rise in the frequency of plan terminations and a growing PBGC
deficit, such systematic underfunding suggests that the law
governing the nation's defined benefit system is structurally flawed
and in need of comprehensive reform. 5 Although the Republican
Congress and Bush Administration hailed the recent passage of the
Pension Protection Act of 200616 ("PPA") as the most compre-
hensive overhaul of the nation's retirement system since the
inception of ERISA, 7 the legislation is not the panacea that
politicians may believe it to be.
Legal scholarship on ERISA reform has focused on proposing
ex post statutory deterrents to prevent companies from terminating
11. See Danny Hakim, With Delphi Filing, Tougher Times for Auto Industry Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Cl (commenting that Delphi's bankruptcy may force General Motors to
restructure its labor costs and pension obligations).
12. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2005par.pdf.
13. Id. at 29. Factors that the PBGC uses to consider future risk of plan termination include,
but are not limited to, the following:
[Slponsor is in Chapter 11 proceedings; sponsor received a minimum funding waiver
within the past five years; sponsor granted security to an unsecured creditor as part of a
renegotiation of debt within the past two years; sponsor is known to have been in
default on existing debt within the past two years (regardless of whether it received a
waiver of default); or sponsor's unsecured debt is rated CCC+/Caal or lower by S&P
or Moody's respectively.
Id.
14. Id. at 13, 22. The PBGC has estimated future liabilities based upon ERISA disclosure
requirements such as Form 5500 submissions and section 4010 filings. Id. at 23.
15. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-294, PRIVATE PENSIONS: RECENT
EXPERIENCES OF LARGE DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING
RULES 37-38 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05294.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE
PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES].
16. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
17. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Looks Forward to
Signing Pension Reform Legislation (Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/08/20060804-4.html.
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defined benefit plans in Chapter 11 proceedings. Specifically,
commentators have recently suggested various changes to the
PBGC's statutory lien priority status as a means of holding plan
sponsors financially accountable for their long-term pension
obligations. 8 Yet the rules governing ERISA's minimum funding
requirements are vast and subject to a certain degree of flexibility. 19
Furthermore, federally mandated disclosure requirements for defined
benefit plans remain opaque and fail to provide regulators,
employees, and the investing public with an accurate and timely
representation of the financial health and funding status of the
nation's pension plans."0
This note explores ERISA's minimum funding rules as they
existed prior to the enactment of the PPA and highlights the
fundamental disconnect that exists between the actual funding level
of the nation's defined benefit plans and the level required of public
corporations in their reported regulatory filings. It also addresses the
PPA's failure to adequately remedy the situation.
Given the complex nature of the statutes governing defined
benefit plans, it is necessary to first understand the basic components
of ERISA in order to identify and contextualize ERISA's
shortcomings. Part II of this note describes the historical background
that gave rise to ERISA and outlines the legislation's key funding
18. See, e.g., Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS.
L. REV. 65, 67 (1991) (proposing that Congress amend ERISA to grant the PBGC a non-lien
"superpriority" to the corporate assets of underfunded pension plans, thereby shifting the risk of
pension termination to creditors); Nicholas J. Brannick, Note, At the Crossroads of Three Codes:
How Employers Are Using ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension
Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577, 1622 (2004) (proposing that Congress amend ERISA to
empower the PBGC to regulate funding waivers and perfect its claims against employers who
underflind pension liabilities on a "floating lien" basis); Jill L. Uylaki, Note, Promises Made,
Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension Plan Income in the Wake of Employer
Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?, 6
ELDER L.J. 77 (1998) (proposing that Congress grant the PBGC lien priority status under the
federal Bankruptcy Code in order to hold employers financially accountable for their pension
obligations).
19. See generally PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15.
20. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-395, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS PROVIDE USEFUL BUT LIMITED INFORMATION ON PLANS'
FINANCIAL CONDITION 3-4 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04395.pdf
[hereinafter PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS]; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-491, PRIVATE PENSIONS: GOVERNMENT ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE THE TIMELINESS
AND CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION 3-5 (2005), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05491.pdf [hereinafter CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION
INFORMATION].
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rules. This section focuses on the tension between the statute's
objective to establish fiscally responsible minimum funding levels,
on the one hand, and to provide plan sponsors with a certain amount
of financial flexibility on the other. Part III describes the statutory
mandate of the PBGC and identifies structural problems that threaten
the medium- to long-term viability of the pension insurance system.
Part IV provides an overview of the federal reporting requirements
that govern the nation's defined benefit system. Finally, Part V
briefly discusses the shortcomings of the PPA and proposes an ex
ante statutory solution to ERISA reform: greater financial
transparency2' of defined benefit plans in regulatory filings and a
bifurcated approach with respect to accounting for pension
obligations.
II. HISTORY OF ERISA AND ITS MINIMUM FUNDING RULES
A. Historical Background
Although Congress began its foray into the world of pension
regulation with the passage of the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act in 1958,22 the spectacular failure of Studebaker-
Packard's pension plans in the 1960s23 served as a national "focusing
event"24 that highlighted the need for a more comprehensive federal
21. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), transparent financial
reporting "provides investors and other users of financial statements with appropriate information
to assess the material risks, rewards, rights, and obligations associated with arrangements." U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET
IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 8
(2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf [hereinafter
ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS].
22. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. As the first federal statute to exclusively address
private-sector employee benefit plans, this legislation required plan sponsors to file both plan
descriptions and annual financial reports with the Department of Labor. Employee Benefits Sec.
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, History of EBSA and ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). The legislation sought to provide plan
participants and their beneficiaries with information sufficient in its scope to enable them to
monitor their plans and prevent the mismanagement of plan assets. Id.
23. James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 683, 733-34
(2001).
24. "As the political scientist John Kingdon observes, social problems often 'need a little
push to get the attention of people in and around government. That push is sometimes provided
by afocusing event like a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem."' Id.
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pension regulation and re-insurance scheme. 5 Indeed, prior to the
1974 enactment of ERISA, there was a paucity of rules mandating
basic pension funding requirements. 6 Additionally, plan participants
lacked any kind of guarantee that they would receive their hard-
earned, promised benefits in the event that their employers
experienced financial difficulty.
2 7
Thus in 1974, Congress passed ERISA legislation to protect the
"well-being and security of millions of employees and their
dependents [that] are directly affected by [employee benefit]
plans."28 At the time, defined benefit plans were the most popular
form of employer-sponsored pensions and were rapidly growing in
both overall plan numbers and individual participants. 9 In order to
encourage the establishment, maintenance, and continuation of the
defined benefit plan, ERISA mandated intricate minimum funding
requirements for employer-sponsored pension plans.3 ° It also created
the PBGC to insure the benefits of plan participants in the event of
employer default.3
The number of defined benefit plans peaked in the late 1970s."
Since then, the percentage of the U.S. labor force covered by such
plans has decreased significantly, as employers have replaced
defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans such as the
401(k).33 Nevertheless, the PBGC continues to insure the pension
benefits of more than 34 million workers and retirees with vested
at 684 (emphasis added) (quoting JOHN W. KJNGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 94-95 (2d ed. 1995)).
25. Id. at 683 ("No single event is more closely associated with ERISA than the shutdown of
the Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana.").
26. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 5.
27. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-360T, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS LIMIT AGENCY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT ITSELF FROM
RISK 4 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05360t.pdf [hereinafter PBGC
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS].
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2005) (amended 2006).
29. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 2.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
32. Join the Queue: More Companies Move Towards Defined-Contribution Pension Plans,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2006, at 72.
33. Id. In recent months, blue chip companies such as IBM, Verizon, and Motorola have
frozen their defined benefit programs and instead, set up 401(k) plans. See id. Recent research
indicates that defined contribution schemes covered 62 percent of workers by 2004. Id. For a
graphical representation of this trend, see infra figs. 1 & 2.
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retirement benefits in approximately 29,000 single-employer defined
pension plans.34 The defined benefit plan therefore remains an
important component of the nation's retirement system.
B. Types of Employee Retirement Benefit Plans
To better contextualize recent trends in U.S. employee
retirement benefits, it is necessary to understand the difference
between defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.
Defined benefit plans guarantee participants a specific level of
pension income upon retirement. In order to calculate a retiree's
pension benefit, plan sponsors use formulae that take into account
such variables as years of company service, final average salary, and
age at retirement. Generally, plan participants receive either a
specified dollar amount multiplied by their years of service at the
company, or a percentage of their final average salary.35
In order to fund their defined pension obligations, companies
make periodic contributions to defined benefit plans based upon
"reasonable actuarial assumptions"36 determined under ERISA's
minimum funding requirements. Professionals then invest these
contributions in a mix of stocks, bonds, and other investment
vehicles according to the plan sponsor's overall demographics,
liquidity needs, and risk/return profile. The accrued pension benefits
of defined plan participants are independent from the value of the
defined benefit plan's assets. Thus, employers bear the full financial
risk of market fluctuations and are liable for funding shortfalls in
their pension plans.37
The most widely known defined contribution plan used for
retirement savings is the 401(k). Unlike defined benefit plans,
34. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 12, at 6.
35. Memorandum in Support of the Debtors' Motion to Reject Their Collective Bargaining
Agreements Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c), at 32-33, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-B-48191
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://www.pd-ual.com/Downloads/
11 13MotionMemo.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].
36. An actuary is a "mathematician employed by [a financial institution] to calculate
premiums, reserves, dividends, and insurance, pension, and annuity rates, using risk factors
obtained from experience tables. These tables are based on both the company's history of...
claims and other industry and general statistical data." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 9 (5th ed. 1998). Federal
regulations govern the standards for actuarial services performed under ERISA. See 20 C.F.R. §
901.0 to .71 (2006); see also PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 8.
37. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 8.
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401(k) plans do not guarantee participants any specific level of
pension income. Instead, participants possess individual accounts
into which they can make pre-tax contributions through payroll
deductions.38  Participants themselves bear responsibility for
investing the funds contributed to their 401 (k) and are often provided
with a limited menu of investment options that might include mutual,
bond, money market, and company stock funds.3 9 In some cases,
magnanimous plan sponsors will even match a portion of each
employee's contribution." Thus, plan participants (who may or may
not be financially literate) must not only fund and invest in their
401(k), but also endure the financial risk of market fluctuations.4
Thus, in stark contrast to defined benefit plans, defined contribution
plans such as the 401(k) are liability-free to plan sponsors.42
C. Funding Requirements43
Congress legislated ERISA's funding rules in order to ensure
that companies set aside and maintain sufficient assets to cover the
retirement benefits they promise to their employees.44 Yet according
to GAO research, "recent terminations of large underfunded plans,
along with continued widespread underfunding, suggest weaknesses
in these rules that may threaten retirement incomes of these plans'
participants, as well as the future viability of the... [PBGC] single-
38. Id. at 5 n.2. Other common types of defined contribution plans include, but are not
limited to, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and employee stock ownership plans. Andrew
L. Gaines, An Introduction to Defined Contribution Plans, in UNDERSTANDING ERISA 2005: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 57 (Joseph R. Simone ed., 2005).
39. Memorandum, supra note 35, at 32-33.
40. Id. at 33.
41. See Caveat Investor: Individuals Are Taking on More Financial Responsibility, Not
Least in Providing for Their Old Age. Maybe They Should Be Better Prepared, ECONOMIST, Jan.
14, 2006, at 71 (arguing that many individuals who participate in defined contribution plans
possess minimal financial literacy and do not necessarily manage their retirement investments
effectively); see also Wharton School of the Univ. of Pa., Hands-Off" Holders of 401(k)
Retirement Accounts Are Not Your Typical Investors, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Mar. 8, 2006, at
I, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf.cfm?articleid=1405 ("Inattentive participants
could get into trouble if they fail to rebalance their accounts from time to time." (quoting
Professor of Insurance and Risk Management Olivia S. Mitchell)).
42. Wharton School of the Univ. of Pa., Unlike Death and Taxes, Pensions Are No Longer
Guaranteed, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Feb. 8, 2006, at 2-4, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn
.edu/article/1 375.cfrn.
43. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Sunarhauserman, Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.),
1997 FED App. 0287P, at 6 n.3 (6th Cir.) (noting that ERISA and Internal Revenue Code rules
governing minimum funding requirements are essentially the same).
44. PBGC STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 1.
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employer insurance program."45 A closer examination of the ERISA
funding rules reveals a number of their current flaws.
A significant difficulty facing companies with defined benefit
plans involves the assumptions and methodologies they employ to
assess pension assets and liabilities.46 A defined pension plan
involves a company's present-day promise to pay participant
retirement benefits years (if not decades) in the future based upon a
predetermined formula. On its face, such a situation presents the
classic characteristics of a basic present value calculation.47 Yet a
scratch beneath the surface of the problem reveals a significantly
more complex scenario. Indeed, such a calculation must take into
account such variables as the future cost of retirement benefits,
average retirement age, and expected mortality rates in addition to a
plan sponsor's estimated return on plan assets.48 For this reason,
ERISA requires all costs, liabilities, rates of interest, and other
factors under the plan to be determined on the basis of reasonable
actuarial assumptions and methods.49 Although teams of financial
analysts, actuaries, and economists may use complex methodologies
and intricate financial models to assign fixed values to these rather
ephemeral variables, the fact remains that at best, such values
represent good faith, educated guesses, and at worst, they provide an
opportunity for plan sponsors to manipulate the net present value of
their pension liabilities.
45. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at highlights.
46. Id. at 26.
47. The basic definition of present value is as follows:
[The] value today of a future payment, or stream of payments, discounted at some
appropriate compound interest-or discount-rate. For example, the present value of
$100 to be received 10 years from now is about $38.55, using a discount rate equal to
10% interest compounded annually.... In security investments, the method is used to
determine how much money should be invested today to result in a certain sum at a
future time.
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 36, at 464. For a graphical representation of the effect of
discount rates on the net present value calculation, see infra fig.3.
48. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 26; see also
BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA 32 (4th ed. 1993).
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2000) (amended 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(3)-1 (as
amended in 2005). Such assumptions include, but are not limited to, normal costs, accrued
liability, past service liabilities, and experience gains and losses. 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(1).
50. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 3-4, 14-15.
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ERISA mandates that defined benefit plans track plan assets and
liabilities using a "funding standard account" ("FSA").5" Charges to
the FSA are determined by assessing the "normal cost" 2 of the plan
for the year and adding to it the amounts necessary to amortize in
equal annual installments unfunded past service liabilities, net
increases in unfunded service liabilities stemming from plan
amendments (if any), net experience loss53 (if any), and net loss
resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions used under the plan
(if any)." Credits to the FSA are determined by adding the amount
considered contributed55 for the plan year to the amount necessary to
amortize in equal annual installments, the net increase in unfunded
past service liability stemming from plan amendments (if any), the
net experience gain (if any), and the net gain resulting from changes
in actuarial assumptions used under the plan (if any). 6 When the
sum of FSA charges and credits is non-negative, the plan will have
met its ERISA-mandated minimum funding requirements. 7 To the
extent that FSA credits exceed charges, the statute permits plan
sponsors to accumulate funding credits ("FSA credits") and use them
to offset future funding shortfalls. 8 Additionally, ERISA specifi-
cally provides for funding credits to accumulate interest based upon a
statutorily defined interest rate.5 9
But if the FSA credits are less than charges, the plan is said to
possess an "accumulated funding deficiency."6  Generally, the
accumulated funding deficiency will carry forward as a charge
51. 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2005).
52. Normal cost is the "[a]nnual cost to a pension plan for the benefits accrued that year by
employees and administrative expenses." COLEMAN, supra note 48, at 212.
53. Experience gains and losses quantify the difference between a plan's actuarial
assumptions and its actual experience. Thus, if an actuary had assumed that plan assets would
earn a 10 percent return in a single year, but the actual return had been only 7 percent, the
experience loss would quantify the 3 percent discrepancy. See id. at 63.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2) (2000) (amended 2005). The statute dictates specific amortization
periods over which to spread each of the charges. Id.
55. Id. § 412(b)(3)(A) (2000) (amended 2005). Use of the words "considered contributed" is
significant in that the statute permits plan sponsors to use non-cash credits to fulfill their
minimum funding obligations under certain circumstances. See id. § 412(g).
56. Id. § 412(b)(3) (2000) (amended 2005). As was the case with charges to the FSA, the
statute dictates corresponding amortization periods over which to spread each of the credits. Id.
57. Id. § 412(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
58. Id. § 4 12 (g) (2000) (amended 2005).
59. Id. § 412(g)(3) (2000) (amended 2005).
60. Id. § 412(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
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against the FSA in the following plan year.6' However, if the plan
sponsor experiences extreme business hardship, it may qualify for a
waiver of the minimum funding requirement.62 If the Secretary of
the Treasury grants such a funding waiver,63 the plan sponsor is
entitled to amortize the funding deficiency over a period of five plan
years rather than carry it forward as a single charge against the FSA
in the following year.' 4 However, if the value of a plan's assets falls
below a statutory threshold,65 ERISA imposes a "deficit reduction
contribution" ("DRC") upon the plan sponsor.66  Under such
circumstances, the plan sponsor must contribute cash (or funding
credits) sufficient to cover 90 percent of the plan's deficit within
three to five years, in addition to any amounts necessary to meet its
yearly minimum funding requirements.67 Although the DRC is
supposed to restore the financial health of underfunded plans,
companies are often too financially distressed to afford the large cash
payments required."
61. Failure to meet the minimum funding requirement is not without penalty. The plan
sponsor must pay a 10 percent excise tax based on the portion of the minimum requirement not
met, id. § 4971(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1310(b) (2000) (amended 2005), and may be required to submit a
form 4010 filing, 29 C.F.R. § 4010.6 to .8 (2006).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 412(d)(1) (2000) (amended 2005). The PBGC considers the following
factors in determining business hardship:
(A) the employer is operating at an economic loss, (B) there is substantial
unemployment or underemployment in the trade or business and in the industry
concerned, (C) the sales and profits of the industry concerned are depressed or
declining, and (D) it is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the
waiver is granted.
Id. § 412(d)(2) (2000) (amended 2005).
63. The Secretary of the Treasury must supply the PBGC with notice of a completed
application for the funding waiver and provide the corporation with an opportunity to comment.
Id. § 412(f)(3)(B)(i)(I) to (II) (2000) (amended 2005). The Secretary may require a company to
provide security with its plan as a condition for granting a funding waiver. See id. § 412(f)(3)(A)
to (B) (2000) (amended 2005).
64. Id. § 412(b)(2)(C) (2000) (amended 2005).
65. A plan is responsible for a deficit reduction contribution if the value of its assets falls
below 80 percent of its liabilities in the current year or if the value of its assets falls below 90
percent of liabilities in the current year and it did not maintain assets of 90 percent or more for
any two consecutive years of the preceding three. Id. § 412(I)(9)(A) to (B) (2000) (amended
2005).
66. Id. § 412(/)(2) (2000) (amended 2005).
67. Memorandum, supra note 35, at 36.
68. Id. at 36-37. The burden and efficacy of the DRC is best described by the following
analogy:
Insofar as plan sponsors are concerned, it is as if Congress had issued an edict to
homeowners with 30-year mortgages that, if the value of their homes drops below 80
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The net effect of using actuarial methodologies to assess plan
assets and liabilities is that companies' sponsors are insulated from
short-term market volatility. Indeed, Treasury Regulations state that
"[t]he funding of plan benefits and the charges and credits to the
funding standard account required by section 412 are generally based
upon the assumption that the defined benefit plan will be continued
by the employer. '69  Because near-term fluctuations in both discount
rate and fair market value tend to average out and correct themselves
over the long term, the funding rules do not fully recognize changes
in liabilities or assets during the precise period in which they occur.7"
In effect, Congress designed ERISA's funding metrics to smooth out
fluctuations in plan assets and liabilities over a period of several
years so that they would reflect significant, long-term market trends,
rather than potentially volatile, present-day fair market value.7'
For example, during the 2004 and 2005 plan years, ERISA
funding rules mandated that the interest rate used to calculate a
plan's current liability fall within a "permissible range," defined as
a rate of interest which is not above, and not more than 10
percent below, the weighted average of the rates of interest
on amounts invested conservatively in long-term invest-
ment grade corporate bonds during the 4-year period ending
on the last day before the beginning of the plan year.
72
percent of the purchase price (for whatever reason), their loans will be accelerated such
that the balance will suddenly become due in just three to five years. Worse yet, this
accelerated funding requirement kicks in at a time when homeowners will likely find it
most difficult to repay the loans because of the very same overarching economic
circumstances that caused the value of their homes to drop.
Id.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)-1(a)(4)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 52.
72. 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I) to (II) (2000) (amended 2005). Historically, the Internal
Revenue Code employed "the weighted average of the rates of interest on 30-year Treasury
securities during the 4-year period ending on the last day before the beginning of the plan year."
Id. § 412(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I) (2000) (amended 2005). In the event that the plan was sufficiently
underfunded to trigger the DRC, the statute mandates that the highest permissible interest rate be
reduced to five percent above the weighted average for the 1999 plan year. See id. §
412(l)(7)(C)(i)(I) to (II) (2000) (amended 2005). Yet for the 2002 and 2003 plan years, Congress
changed the upper range to 120 percent of the weighted average. See id § 412(l)(7)(C)(i)(III)
(2000) (amended 2005). For a detailed discussion of the effect of interest rate selection on
pension liabilities, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-313, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
PROCESS NEEDED TO MONITOR THE MANDATED INTEREST RATE FOR PENSION CALCULATIONS
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03313.pdf.
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The code grants sponsors even wider latitude in determining the
value of plan assets. Indeed, a plan actuary need only employ "any
reasonable actuarial method of valuation which takes into account
fair market value and which is permitted under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary. '73 Treasury Regulations define the outer
limits of reasonable actuarial value as an amount not less than 80
percent nor greater than 120 percent of the current fair market value
of plan assets.74
As the GAO insightfully noted in a recent report, "[B]ecause of
leeway in the actuarial methodology and assumptions that sponsors
may use to measure plan assets and liabilities, underfunding may
actually [be] more severe and widespread than reported. 75 Indeed,
because ERISA's methodologies were designed to represent longer-
term market trends, a precipitous drop in the fair market value of a
plan's assets or a steep decline in interest rates would not be
immediately recognized in minimum funding calculations, but
instead gradually phased in over a period of several years.76 For
example, the falling interest rates and declining equity prices in the
year 2000 would have significantly decreased the value of plan
assets, while at the same time lowering the discount rate used to
calculate the net present value of pension obligations. Technically,
such a scenario should result in a dramatic increase in unfunded
pension liabilities. Yet because the minimum funding rules permit a
company to gradually factor market fluctuations into the minimum
funding calculation, the plan sponsor might have actually reported a
decrease in pension liabilities.
A similar disconnect exists in the valuation of FSA credits. For
example, during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, a plan
73. 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(2)(A) (2000) (amended 2005). For detailed rules governing
"reasonable actuarial valuation methods," see Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)- 1.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)- 1 (b)(6)(i). The regulations also state that the actuarial value of
assets reflect fair market value if they take into account average value of plan assets for a period
not to exceed five years. See id. §§ 1.412(c)(2)-1(b)(4)(ii), 1.412(c)(2)-l(b)(7).
75. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 3.
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)-1(a)(4)(ii). Although the same is true of an increase in fair
market value of plan assets and a steep rise in interest rates, failure to immediately recognize a
positive funding trend is less disturbing, as it represents a net improvement in plan sponsor's
financial health. One must also consider the market conditions of 2001 and 2002: not only did
equity values drop precipitously, but interest rates also fell to their lowest level in 40 years. Greg
Ip, Lethargic Economy Could Tip Fed Toward Interest-Rate Cut, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at
A2. Such conditions would have effectively amplified the disconnect between the present day
fair market and actuarial value of assets.
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sponsor might have accrued $10 million in funding credits by
contributing to its plan in excess of the minimum funding threshold.
Perhaps the sponsor then invested this amount in a once high-flying
(but now defunct) stock such as Enron. Notwithstanding the fact that
the Enron stock certificates are no longer worth the paper on which
they are printed, the statute allows the sponsor to slowly amortize its
$10 million loss as a charge to the FSA over a period of several
years. Furthermore, the plan sponsor may continue to carry forward
the $10 million in prior funding credits, earn interest on the credits,
and eventually use the credits as a non-cash plan contribution to
offset future minimum funding obligations."
To wit, ERISA's current funding rules leave plan sponsors with
sufficient flexibility to report adequate funding levels based upon
actuarial assumptions when the financial condition of the plan may in
fact be rapidly deteriorating. Provided that the company sponsoring
the plan is adequately capitalized, financially stable, and can
continue to operate as a going concern, actuarial methodologies that
assess plan funding levels based on long-term market trends may
indeed be appropriate. On the other hand, a company in a troubled
industry that experiences a combination of increased competition,
shrinking profit margins, and deteriorating finances is more likely to
liquidate or seek bankruptcy protection in the near- to medium-term.
Under such circumstances, the utility of ERISA's minimum funding
scheme-which assumes that defined benefit plans will be continued
by employers-diminishes rapidly. Furthermore, statutory pension
reporting requirements amplify the negative effects of the already
opaque system of funding rules and represent a disservice to
employees, government regulators, and investors."
III. THE ROLE OF THE PBGC
A. Statutory Purpose and Financing
ERISA established the PBGC to maintain the overall integrity of
the nation's voluntary private pension system.79 The agency carries
77. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 22.
78. See discussion infra Part IV.
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (amended 2005). The PBGC's Congressional mandate is
as follows:
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out its mandate by providing plan sponsors with low-cost insurance
to cover pension obligations in the event of plan termination," and
by monitoring the financial health of defined benefit plans covered
by ERISA.81 As a self-sufficient, federal corporation within the
Department of Labor ("DOL"), the PBGC possesses a $100 million
line of credit with the U.S. Treasury, but otherwise does not receive
any funding from general tax revenues." Instead, the agency funds
its operations primarily through a statutorily defined premium
structure set by Congress and paid by the companies who sponsor
defined benefit plans.83 The PBGC derives additional revenues from
the assets of plans trusteed by the agency, recoveries from companies
whose plans were terminated, and investment income.84
Yet Bradley Belt, Executive Director of the PBGC, has
commented that the agency's "ability to manage its finances is
severely limited. Unlike a private insurer, PBGC cannot control its
revenues ... [or] its expenses. PBGC's premiums are set by
Congress, and companies sponsoring insured pension plans can
transfer their unfunded liabilities to PBGC as long as they meet the
statutory criteria."85  Furthermore, according to the PBGC's 2004
Annual Report, "[t]he current massive underfunding of defined
benefit pensions, compounded by the financial struggles of major
industries that rely heavily on these pensions, has greatly increased
the risk of loss for the pension insurance program."86 Based upon
recent estimates, the PBGC faces a medium- to long-term shortfall of
approximately $23 billion. 7 Absent a government bailout or drastic
The purposes of this subchapter, which are to be carried out by the corporation, are-
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans
for the benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted
payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under plans to which this
subchapter applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under
section 1306 of this title at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations
under this subchapter.
Id. § 1302(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
80. Id.
81. Id. §§ 1302, 1308, 1310 (2000) (amended 2005).
82. Id. §§ 1305, 1306 (2000) (amended 2005).
83. Id.
84. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2004), available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2004-annual_report.pdf.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. at 5.
87. See id. at 4, 12, 16.
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changes to the PBGC's premium structure, the agency will continue
to operate at a deficit and may ultimately default on its obligations.88
B. PBGC Insurance Coverage
Unlike other federal insurance schemes such as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the PBGC does not
possess the statutory authority to effectively protect itself from risk.89
This is because ERISA requires the agency to provide insurance to
any defined benefit plan that meets basic statutory requirements,9"
while at the same time restricting the PBGC's ability to charge
premiums commensurate with market conditions.9 Thus, the agency
may not take into consideration a plan sponsor's financial health,
industry outlook, or credit risk, but instead must assess premiums
based upon a pre-determined statutory regime.92 Prior to the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, plan sponsors were required to pay a flat rate
premium of $19 per participant per annum.93  To the extent that a
plan was not fully funded, sponsors paid a variable rate premium of
$9 for every $1,000 of unvested benefits94 per participant per
annum. 95  Considering the potential liabilities at stake, PBGC
88. See Wharton School of the Univ. of Pa., United Airlines' Pension Problem: Who,
Ultimately, Is Going to Pay?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Sept. 8, 2004, at 3, http://knowledge
.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf.cfn?articleid=1033&CFID=63602788CFTOKEN=641933198jsess
ionid=a83050ce09e46c73673F [hereinafter Pension Problem] ("The PBGC... was created as the
'pension fund of last resort' and is not equipped to cover the liabilities now looming." (quoting
Professor Elizabeth Bailey)).
89. See PBGC STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 27.
90. In order to qualify for PBGC insurance, a plan must fall under the statutory definition of
"defined benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2)(A), 132 1(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
91. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 15.
92. Changes in PBGC premium rates are subject to approval by a joint resolution of
Congress. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (2000) (amended 2005).
93. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Insurance Premiums, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/
key-resources-for-the-press/content/page 13541 .html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
94. Unfunded vested benefits are the amount of unfunded current liability if only vested
benefits are taken into account.
95. Under the recently enacted Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120
Stat. 4, flat rate premiums increased to $30 per participant per annum, while the variable rate
premium remained constant. The legislation also introduced a new termination premium of
$1,250 per participant per annum that is triggered when a company transfers its underfunded
pension plan to the PBGC. The termination premium is payable for three years after termination
of the defined benefit plan. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., PBGC Premiums Rise
with Enactment of Budget Reconciliation Bill (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/
news-archive/2006/prO6-26.html. It appears that Congress is attempting to reduce the PBGC's
$23 billion funding shortfall by raising fixed rate premiums. In effect, today's most well-funded,
responsible plan sponsors are paying the price for yesterday's terminated pension plans. Not only
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premiums represent a somewhat paltry sum. Indeed, since the
agency's inception in 1974, UAL paid approximately $50 million in
premiums, yet it defaulted on approximately $6 billion in unfunded
pension liabilities.96
Therefore, a company such as UAL may follow ERISA's
minimum funding requirements to the letter of the law, exhibit a
significant shortfall in funding its pension obligations, and still
qualify for PBGC insurance at the below-market rates mandated by
Congress. And the PBGC does not possess the regulatory authority
to suspend such plans in order to hedge itself from additional
liability. Nor may the agency require the plan sponsor to fund
pension obligations in a manner that varies from ERISA's minimum
funding and DRC requirements. In fact, the PBGC's only statutory
remedy under ERISA is to preemptively terminate a pension plan
and assume its unfunded liabilities in order to protect itself from
incurring an even greater long-term loss.97
Upon the termination of a defined pension plan, the PBGC
receives a lien against the employer for the amount of the unfunded
vested pension obligations." A lien arising from a plan termination
during bankruptcy proceedings has not been perfected and therefore
lacks priority status among creditors.99 Nevertheless, even if the
does the new premium schedule impose excessively high fixed rates upon plan sponsors, but also
it fails to adequately reflect the fair market value of the PBGC's risk.
96. See Pension Problem, supra note 88, at 2.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (amended 2005). ERISA authorizes the PBGC to file a petition
in federal court to commence "involuntary termination" proceedings against a pension plan under
the following circumstances: (1) a company has failed to meet the minimum funding requirement;
(2) the pension plan can no longer afford to pay retiree benefits when due; or (3) failure to
immediately terminate a plan will expose the PBGC to unreasonable liability. Id.
ERISA also permits a financially troubled sponsor to voluntarily file for "distress
termination." In order to qualify for distress termination, the PBGC must find that the sponsor
and all members of its control group have met one of the following criteria: (1) the sponsor has
filed for Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings; (2) the sponsor has filed for Chapter 11
reorganization proceedings, and the bankruptcy court concludes that the financial burden of its
pension obligations will prevent the company from continuing operations; or (3) pension costs
have become overly burdensome solely on account a drastic change in workforce demographics.
29 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (2000) (amended 2005).
Although ERISA permits voluntary terminations as well, such rules apply to fully funded
plans and are therefore outside the scope of the present paper.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1368 (2000) (amended 2005).
99. Id.
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PBGC did have priority status, ERISA caps the agency's ability to
recover at 30 percent of the firm's value at the time of bankruptcy.' 0
C. The Moral Hazard of PBGC Insurance
The existence of moral hazard' in the PBGC's defined benefit
insurance scheme is best described by Steven Kandarian, the former
Executive Director of PBGC:
Pension insurance creates moral hazard, tempting
management and labor at financially troubled companies to
make promises that they cannot or will not fund. The cost
of wage increases is immediate, while the cost of pension
increases can be deferred for up to 30 years .... In
exchange for smaller wage increases today, companies
often offer more generous pension benefits tomorrow,
knowing that if the company fails the plan will be handed
over to the PBGC. 1
02
In effect, a financially distressed company may use its defined
benefit plan as leverage to extract lower wage concessions from its
workforce. Furthermore, the mere existence of federally mandated
PBGC insurance may cause this promise to appear valuable to
employees even if the company perennially underfunds its pension
obligations.0 3 In the meantime, the company itself has no incentive
to shore up its pension plan and may instead reinvest free cash in its
core business or pay shareholder dividends. The company may even
be tempted to invest pension assets in risky securities in order
increase its rate of return on plan assets and thus reduce future
funding requirements. Finally, if a company finds that its defined
benefit plan has become too onerous, it may even file for Chapter 11
protection and use bankruptcy proceedings as a means of reneging on
100. Id.
101. Judge Posner defines moral hazard as the "tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to
prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk to an
insurance company." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998).
102. Safeguarding America's Retirement Security: An Examination of Defined Benefit
Pension Plans and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, and Int'l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 61
(2003) (statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_-files/sprtl 08285retirementsecurity.pdf.
103. See Brannick, supra note 18, at 1592-94; see also PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN
FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 9.
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its promised pension obligations and transferring its defined benefit
plan to the PBGC. °4
Yet the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC are not the panacea
that workers may believe them to be. Indeed, the moral hazard of
pension insurance transfers pension termination risk onto unsus-
pecting employees as well." 5 For example, the current maximum
PBGC guarantee for an underfunded pension plan terminated in 2007
is $49,500 per annum for an individual who retires at age 65.106 Yet
an employee may have worked at a company for his entire career,
holding a vested pension benefit, the value of which greatly exceeds
this statutory maximum guarantee. Worse yet, to the extent that an
individual retires before reaching the age of 65, the PBGC is required
by law to adjust the maximum guaranteed benefit downward. 7 For
example, an individual might retire early at age 50 based on his
company's promise of a yearly pension income of $45,000. Several
years later, when the individual is only 55 years old, his company
might file for bankruptcy and terminate a severely underfunded
defined benefit plan. Under current law, the PBGC would only
guarantee this individual $22,275 per annum. 108 Furthermore, unlike
the FDIC, the PBGC does not enjoy the backing of the full faith and
credit of the United States Treasury; if the PBGC continues to
operate at a loss, it may ultimately default on the very pension
obligations it insures.0 9 Thus, ERISA legislation causes the PBGC
and rank and file employees to be the unwitting beneficiaries of
corporate America's unfunded pension obligations.
IV. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
ERISA requires that companies sponsoring defined benefit plans
make annual reports to plan participants and government regulators
alike."0  To the extent that the plan sponsor is part of a publicly
traded company, Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
regulations require that the company disclose certain aspects of its
104. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 9.
105. See Brannick, supra note 18, at 1592-94.
106. Pension Guarantees, supra note 6.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 1.
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023-1024 (2000) (amended 2005).
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pension obligations in periodic filings as well."' Although such
filings do indeed report important details on pension funding levels
to employees, regulators, and investors, federal disclosure
requirements are inconsistent and fall well short of providing the
public with a clear and fully informed picture of the defined benefit
plan's financial health."2
A. Form 5500 Reporting Requirements
The DOL, Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and PBGC jointly
developed Form 5500 in order to monitor the health of retirement
plans. 3 and enforce compliance with ERISA's statutory require-
ments." '4 The core Form 5500 requires that the plan disclose basic
information such as plan features, number of participants, funding
method, and accrued vested benefits." 5 Various schedules accom-
panying Form 5500 include additional disclosures such as financial
reports and information on future benefit obligations." 6  For
example, Schedule H contains audited financial statements of plan
operations that regulators use to assess the overall financial health of
a defined benefit plan."7 Schedule B, on the other hand, contains
actuarial information on plan assets and liabilities as well as the basic
assumptions used to arrive at these calculations." 8
The DOL, IRS, and PBGC rely heavily upon data reported on
Form 5500 and its schedules "to identify actual and potential
111. See, e.g., FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 87: EMPLOYERS ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS 35-38 (1985), available at http://
www.fasb.org/pdf/fas87.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS]
(discussing the GAAP rules for reporting pension assets and liabilities); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2000) (establishing periodic reporting requirements for publicly traded companies); 17 C.F.R. §
229.303 (2006) (delineating the basic elements that a company must disclose in the Management
Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") portion of Form 10-K to increase transparency of its
financial statements).
112. See PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 6; ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-
BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 52-53.
113. Form 5500 covers both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, each of which has
mandatory reporting requirements under ERISA. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION
INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 6-7.
114. Id. at 11-13.
115. For a detailed description of Form 5500 reporting requirements, see INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. ET AL., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 5500: ANNUAL RETURN/REPORT OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLAN (2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2005-5500inst.pdf.
116. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 12-13.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 13-14.
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violations of ERISA and the [Internal Revenue Code], as well as for
research and policy formulation.""' 9 Thus, the data reported provides
the government with key metrics used to assess compliance with
ERISA's minimum funding rules, establish potential PBGC liability,
and assess PBGC premiums. 12  More important yet, the disclosures
provided in Form 5500 serve as the basis for the statutorily mandated
"Summary Annual Report," in which plan sponsors provide
participants and their beneficiaries with information related to the
financial health and funding level of their defined benefit plans.'
2'
Termination liability, which may be the best measure of an
underfunded plan's pension obligations, is conspicuously absent
from the Form 5500 reporting requirements. 2  Indeed, plan sponsors
need only report termination liability to the PBGC in the event that
the value of the plan's unfunded vested benefits exceeds $50 million,
the plan itself misses required contributions greater than $1 million,
or the plan receives a minimum funding waiver greater than $1
million.'23 Additionally, the statute specifically prohibits PBGC
disclosure of information reported under section 1310 unless the
information has already been made public. 24  Consequently,
reporting requirements fail to provide plan participants and investors
alike with valuable information that the government itself considers
material to assessing the risk profile of underfunded pension plans.
2 5
Furthermore, due to a combination of statutory reporting
requirements, ERISA Filing Acceptance System ("EFAST") process-
ing complications, and the DOL procedures, Form 5500 data may not
be released until three years after its initial filing. 26 Indeed, under
ERISA, a plan sponsor must comply with reporting requirements
within 210 days after the end of the plan's year.' 7 Yet the law
119. Id. at 11.
120. Id. at 15-16.
121. Id. at 19.
122. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 19.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1310(b) (2000) (amended 2005); 29 C.F.R. §§ 4010.6 to .8. In addition to
termination liability, plan sponsors who meet the statutory criteria must submit detailed financial
information to the PBGC in a 4010 filing. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 7-
8.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1310(c) (2000) (amended 2005), 29 C.F.R. § 4010.12.
125. See PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 19.
126. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 20. For a graphical
representation of the Form 5500 filing deadlines, see id. at 21, and see also infra fig.4.
127. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 20.
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permits sponsors to make minimum funding contributions to their
defined benefit plans as late as eight and one-half months after the
end of the plan year. '28 Since plan actuaries cannot complete and
certify Form 5500 until the plan has met its minimum funding
requirement, sponsors often apply to the IRS for an automatic two
and one-half month filing extension each year.'29
To further complicate matters, the IRS permits plan sponsors to
file Schedule T Amendments to cure certain reporting errors in Form
5500 as late as one month after the already extended filing
deadline.'3 ° Moreover, despite this extended reporting window, the
DOL notes that in 2001, approximately 11 percent of plans were late
in filing Form 5500."' In fact, GAO research indicates that
corporations prioritize SEC filings and income tax preparation over
ERISA reporting obligations.'
3 2
The EFAST processing procedures also complicate the
government's ability to process Form 5500 data in a timely
manner.' 33  Prior to the PPA, the law did not require that plan
sponsors file Form 5500 electronically.' 34  Consequently, nearly 98
percent of plan sponsors submit paper versions of the form.'35
The DOL then processes the forms, audits them, identifies
reporting errors, and works with plan sponsors to correct mistakes
and discrepancies in data.' 36 By the time the DOL has completed its
administrative review of Form 5500 data, as many as three years may
have passed, and the funding disclosures contained in the filings are
stale. '
128. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(10)(a)(ii) (2000) (amended 2005).
129. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 25.
130. Id. at 22-23.
131. Id. at 28.
132. Id. at 25-26.
133. Id. at 28; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104a-5 (describing the operations of EFAST). For a
graphical representation of the EFAST processing system, see CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION
INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 32 fig.9, and infra fig.5.
134. CONTENT OF FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 30.
135. Id. at 28. In 2001, EFAST processed approximately 25 million paper pages of Form
5500 filings. Id. The DOL estimates that "paper filings take more than three times as long as
electronic filings to process and have nearly as many errors." Id.
136. Id. at 30-31.
137. Id. at 33.
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B. SEC Reporting Requirements and Financial Accounting
Standards Board Accounting Conventions
Whereas Form 5500 seeks to provide government regulators
with information on the funding status of defined benefit plans, SEC
disclosures aim to provide investors with information on how
retirement benefits affect earnings, cash flow, and overall financial
position. For example, Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires that a
company discuss its financial condition, changes in financial
condition, and results of operations in the MD&A portion of its
annual Form 10-K filings. 38 The company must not only discuss its
current liquidity, capital resources, and results from operations, but
also disclose any known trends, uncertainties, or other considerations
that would have a material impact on its future business prospects.
39
Thus, the regulation serves as a "caveat investor" and requires that
company management highlight key forward-looking considerations
that would lead to a disconnect between its reported financial
statements and future financial outlook.
40
Yet a recent study by the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance revealed significant deficiencies in Item 303 disclosures,
particularly as they related to company pension plans. 14' Cognizant
of the fact that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP") 142 allow plan sponsors to employ actuarial methodologies
that smooth plan assets and liabilities, 143 the SEC noted that the
"negative stock market returns of the last three years caused many
companies to have significant unrecognized losses related to their
138. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2006).
139. Id.
140. See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
554-56 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of MD&A disclosure mandated by SEC
Regulation S-K Item 303).
141. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Summary by the Division of Corporation Finance of
Significant Issues Addressed in the Review of the Periodic Reports of the Fortune 500
Companies, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007)
[hereinafter Review of Periodic Reports] (reporting the results of a study involving the financial
and non-financial disclosures of Fortune 500 companies in their 2002 Form 10-K filings).
142. GAAP are "conventions, rules, and procedures that define accepted accounting practice,
including broad guidelines as well as detailed procedures." DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note
36, at 234. The independent body responsible for establishing and interpreting GAAP is the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). Id. at 202.
143. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 111
(describing FASB's accounting treatment of pension plans).
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pension plans, which are often not transparent to investors."'" In
order to increase transparency, the agency requested that companies
expand their Regulation S-K 303 disclosure to include discussion of
significant assumptions and estimates used to account for pension
plans as well as the underlying methodologies used to determine
them. 145 The agency also noted that companies should disclose "[t]he
amount of current unrecognized losses on pension assets and the
estimated effect of those losses on future pension expense .... 46
Furthermore, the SEC requested that companies identify expected
changes in pension trends, especially those involving estimated
investment returns and discount rates, and the effect that such
changes would have on their future financial condition. 47  Finally,
the SEC asked that companies provide investors with a sensitivity
analysis that demonstrates how hypothetical changes to actuarial
assumptions would affect future expected pension returns.
148
C. A Paradigm Shift: Pension Accounting and Financial Accounting
Standards Board Reform
As noted by a research fellow at the TIAA-CREF Institute,
"Pension accounting in the U.S. has widely been recognized as one
of the most backward areas of all accounting and in dire need of
reform.... [W]e got ourselves in a terrible mess the last few years.
The accounting rules are part of this."' 49  Enhanced pension
disclosure in the MD&A portion of Form 10-K will certainly
improve the public's understanding of corporate defined benefit
obligations. But the SEC requires public companies to employ
GAAP to prepare financial statements.'i And the Financial
144. Review of Periodic Reports, supra note 141 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Wharton School of the Univ. of Pa., How Should Retirement Policy Be Reformed? Don't
Speak All Together, Please, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 2, 2004, at 4, http://knowledge
.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf cfm?articleid=986&CFID=49471148CFTOKEN=53631401
(quoting principal research fellow Douglas Fore).
150. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. IV 2006) (describing the periodic filing
requirements of the Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. 229.10(e) (2006) (describing standards for
use of non-GAAP financial measures in periodic filings); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2006) (requiring
annual reports to be made on Form 10-K); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC 1673(03-07), FORM
10-K: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 10 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
formIO-k.pdf [hereinafter FORM 10-K] (requiring the use of GAAP by incorporation).
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Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") permits accountants to use
smoothing mechanisms and actuarial assumptions that effectively
distort the true funding status of defined benefit plans.'5'
The GAAP conventions governing pension accounting are as
complex as ERISA's minimum funding requirement-and equally
deceptive.'52 Although companies must include a yearly charge for
"pension expense" in their calculation of net income, this value is in
effect an accounting fiction that fails to reflect the true periodic cost
for maintaining a defined benefit plan. 5 3 The primary component of
pension expense consists of the plan's annual service cost, which is
the present value of accrued benefits for the most recent plan year.
Because accountants calculate each year's pension expense based
upon actuarial assumptions for interest rates, investment returns, and
participant mortality rates, the actual performance of pension assets
may differ-sometimes drastically-from the original estimate.'54
The resulting difference between actual experience and actuarial
assumptions is relegated to an off-balance sheet "unrecognized gains
or losses account" that appears as a footnote to the company's
financial statement.'55 In the event that the "unrecognized gains or
losses account" reaches a certain FASB-mandated threshold, the
company must recognize the difference between the threshold and
the "unrecognized gains or losses account" in its periodic pension
expense.'56
In effect, GAAP permits companies to relegate pension assets
and liabilities to the footnotes of key financial statements to such an
extent that they almost function as off-balance sheet vehicles.'57 It
should therefore come as no surprise that a recent study by the
Federal Reserve postulated that pension accounting artificially
151. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 111, at 15-19; see
also PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 21-23; Howard Silverblatt, America's
Other Pension Problem, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/
investor/content/dec2005/pi20051219_9796_piOI5.htm.
152. See generally STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 111, at
38-47 (describing GAAP accounting conventions for pension assets and liabilities).
153. See PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 22-23.
154. Id.
155. Id. at23n.34.
156. Id.
157. ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, supra note 21, at 52.
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inflated corporate earnings and partially contributed to the stock
market bubble of the late 1990s.'58
D. Revised FASB Pension Accounting Rules
If pension reforms were to promote financial transparency, then
new rules for pension accounting would also be necessary. In late
2005, the board of the FASB unanimously voted to review its
standards on pension accounting.15 9 It proposed adding pension
obligations and other pension related expenses to the balance sheet
by the end of 2006 and began conducting studies to explore new
methodologies for pension accounting. 6  As an initial step in what is
likely to be a comprehensive, long-term overhaul of pension
accounting standards, the FASB issued Statement 158, which
mandates that companies "[r]ecognize the overfunded or under-
funded status of a single-employer defined benefit postretirement
plan . . as an asset or liability in its statement of financial
position... "161 Under the FASB's new rule, the extent to which a
plan is "overfunded" or "underfunded" appears on the sponsor's
balance sheet and is determined as of the plan sponsor's fiscal year-
end as the difference between the fair value of a plan's assets and its
projected benefit obligation. 62 Additionally, Statement 158 requires
plan sponsors to take a charge against other comprehensive income
for pension expenses that had previously been relegated to the off
balance sheet "unrecognized gains or losses" account under FASB
Statement 87.163
158. See generally Julia Lynn Coronado & Steven A. Sharpe, Did Pension Plan Accounting
Contribute to a Stock Market Bubble?, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 323 (2003)
(describing the effect of pension accounting on non-core corporate earnings).
159. Silverblatt, supra note 151; see also infra note 186.
160. Id.; see also ANDREW D. WOZNIAK & DAVID B. CHIrrIM, FASB PENSION ACCOUNTING
OVERHAUL BEGINS 1 (2005), available at http://www.melloninstitutional.com/public/library/
documents/knowledge/pdfs/FASB.pdf ("The objective is to improve financial statement reporting
of pensions and other postretirement employee benefits (OPEB) plans by making the information
more useful and transparent for investors, creditors, plan participants, and other users.").
161. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., No. 284-B, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 158: EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION AND OTHER
POSTRETIREMENT PLANS 1 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf [hereinafter
NO. 158] (footnote omitted). The FASB has indicated that the next phase of pension accounting
reform will address, inter alia, income statement recognition, liability measurement, and
assumption setting guidance. WOZNIAK & CHITTIM, supra note 160, at 1.
162. NO. 158, supra note 161, at 3-6.
163. See id. at 62-64, 86; see also supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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Since the FASB's new pension accounting standards have just
taken effect, it is not yet possible to ascertain their full financial
impact on large industrial companies with significant funding
shortfalls, such as UAL, Delta, General Motors, and Ford."
Nevertheless, analysts at Credit Suisse Group recently estimated that
the FASB's effort to improve the financial transparency of pension
and postretirement benefits might reduce shareholder equity in the
S&P 500 index by as much as $255 billion, or seven percent.165
V. PROPOSAL FOR TRANSPARENT PENSION DISCLOSURE
A. Enactment of the PPA
According to Congressman Howard McKeon, Vice-Chairman of
the House-Senate pension reform conference, "The Pension
Protection Act [H.R. 4] ensures that worker pension plans are fully
funded, encourages companies and unions to keep their pension
promises to workers and retirees, and provides workers the peace of
mind that their retirement savings will be there for them when they
need it."' 66 The PPA does indeed take a number of important steps to
strengthen the nation's defined benefit plans. For example, the
legislation strengthens ERISA's minimum funding rules by: (i)
closing the statutory loophole that permitted plan sponsors to make
non-cash contributions using FSA credits;'67 (ii) requiring companies
to measure pension assets and liabilities more accurately;'68 (iii)
prohibiting companies with under-funded plans from promising their
164. According to Statement 158, the new pension accounting standards apply to companies
whose fiscal year ends after December 15, 2006. See No. 158, supra note 161, at 7-8, 80-82, 84.
165. BNA, FASB's Pension Accounting Proposal Will Cut Shareholder Equity Significantly,
in FASB's CHANGES TO PENSION ACCOUNTING 4, 4 (2006), available at http://www.bna.com/
tm/ads/fasb.pdf.
166. Press Release, House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, President Signs Measure to
Reform Outdated Worker Pension Laws: Legislation Strengthens Pension Funding Rules,
Modernizes Retirement Security Laws (Aug. 17, 2006), http://republicans.edlabor.house.gov/
archive/press/press 1 09/second/08aug/pensionsigning081706.htm.
167. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE
"PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS
CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, at 9-11, 19-20 (2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-38-06.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4]; see
also Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 101, 102, 111, 112, 120 Stat. 780,
784, 789, 820, 826.
168. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 14-22, 75. These include
specific assumptions for mortality tables, interest rates, at risk plans, etc. Id.; see also Pension
Protection Act §§ 101, 102, 111, 112.
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workers additional retirement benefits unless such promises are paid
for up front; 69 and (iv) raising the limit on employer pension
contributions, so that companies can contribute more cash during
periods of economic expansion and build a funding cushion to keep
plans solvent during periods of economic contraction. 7 ° Addition-
ally, the PPA seeks to improve transparency by requiring plan
sponsors to file an updated version of Form 5500 using EFAST and
mandating that the DOL make public the contents of the form no
later than 90 days after it has been filed.'7' Finally, the law makes
permanent the temporary PBGC premium increases that were
enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.172
Although comprehensive in scope, the PPA also contains a
number of fundamental flaws. Indeed, the legislation makes signif-
icant concessions to special interest groups such as government
contractors, bus operators, and airlines that effectively eviscerate the
statute's intent.'73 For example, the PPA permits Pentagon contrac-
tors with over $5 billion in sales to delay implementing the statute's
new funding requirements for up to three years.'74 Additionally, the
statute permits bankrupt airlines with frozen pension plans, such as
Delta and Northwest, to make up their funding shortfalls over a span
of 17 years.175  By comparison, airlines such as Continental and
American, which enjoy greater financial stability and have not yet
frozen their pension plans, are given up to 10 years to make up their
funding shortfalls.
176
Since large government contractors and commercial airlines are
among the very industries burdened by legacy pension obligations, it
169. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 26-27; see also Pension
Protection Act §§ 103, 113.
170. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 14-22, 75; see also Pension
Protection Act §§ 101, 102, 111, 112.
171. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 107, 111-13, 121; see also
Pension Protection Act §§ 501, 503, 504.
172. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 81; see also Pension Protection
Act § 401; supra note 92.
173. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 35-36, 38, 84-88; see also
Pension Protection Act §§ 106, 114, 402.
174. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 35-36; see also Pension
Protection Act §§ 106, 114.
175. Pension Protection Act § 402.
176. Under the PPA, most defined benefit plans have only seven years to make up their
pension shortfalls. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 84-88; see also
Pension Protection Act § 402.
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follows that they are also most likely to suffer from endemic pension
funding deficiencies. That Congress would exempt such companies
from the requirements of comprehensive reform legislation therefore
seems self-defeating.
Equally disturbing is the fact that the PPA made permanent the
PBGC premium hikes enacted under the Deficient Reduction Act of
2005. Indeed, it appears that Congress is attempting to reduce the
PBGC's $23 billion funding shortfall by raising fixed-rate premiums.
In effect, today's most well-funded, responsible plan sponsors are
paying the price for yesterday's terminated pension plans. Not only
does the new premium schedule impose excessively high fixed rates
upon plan sponsors, but it also fails to adequately reflect the fair
market value of the PBGC's risk.
B. Additional Reform Still Necessary
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the "well-being and security
of millions of employees and their dependents [who] are directly
affected by [employee benefit plans].""' Yet the ubiquity of plan
underfunding, the frequency of large plan terminations, and the
magnitude of the PBGC's growing deficit all indicate that ERISA is
structurally flawed and fails to achieve its statutory purpose. Under
such circumstances, the law governing the nation's defined benefit
system will continue encouraging "moral hazard," thus permitting
corporations such as UAL to legally underfund and ultimately shirk
their pension obligations to employees.
The newly enacted PPA is unlikely to deter many of the
widespread abuses that were rampant yet legal under the previous
legislative regime. Federal disclosure requirements remain incon-
sistent and fall well short of providing the public with a clear, timely,
and fully informed picture of the defined benefit plan's financial
health. Historically, the combination of ERISA's flawed funding
rules and the FASB's pension accounting conventions have
amplified the fundamental disconnect that exists between the actual
funding levels of the corporate defined benefit plans and those which
companies are legally obligated to report in public filings.
Consequently, neither government regulators nor the free market
have wielded sufficient information to hold corporations accountable
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
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for shirking their pension obligations until it is too late. Indeed, by
the time corporations begin to hint in public filings that their defined
benefit plans may be slightly underfunded, it is likely that their
pension plans are in fact in financial distress and on the brink of
termination.
1 8
C. Streamlining Pension Reporting Obligations
Accordingly, it is crucial that Congress amend ERISA to
enhance the financial transparency of corporate defined benefit
plans. New legislation should provide the DOL, IRS, and PBGC
with greater statutory flexibility and encourage these agencies to
work with the SEC to streamline pension reporting obligations. In
fact, Congress might immediately improve the timeliness and
accuracy of pension reporting obligations simply by requiring public
companies to attach Form 5500 as an exhibit to Form 10-K filings.
The simultaneous filing of Forms 10-K and 5500 would
encourage companies to report a single, synchronized set of pension
disclosures. The metrics contained in Form 5500 include actuarial
assumptions and pension funding levels, each of which companies
must report under current SEC regulations.'79 Yet the information
currently reported in Forms 10-K and 5500 is inconsistent, not only
because companies employ different actuarial assumptions, but also
because reporting periods may not match.18 Nevertheless, in a post-
Enron environment in which government regulators and investors
closely scrutinize SEC filings, it is likely that market forces alone
would incentivize companies to synchronize pension disclosure.
Additionally, the SEC's filing requirements are significantly
more stringent than those of the DOL.' Whereas electronic filing
historically has been the exception for Form 5500, it is the norm for
SEC filings.'82 Not only is it mandatory for companies to submit
Form 10-K electronically, but also its filing window is significantly
shorter than that required for Form 5500.' If companies are late in
178. Cf PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 28
(describing the funding status of Bethlehem Steel immediately prior to bankruptcy).
179. See supra Part IV.B; see also Review of Periodic Reports, supra note 141.
180. See Review of Periodic Reports, supra note 141. For a graph depicting the difference in
interest rate assumptions disclosed in Forms 5500 and 10-K, see infra fig.6.
181. See generally FORM 10-K, supra note 150 (outlining Form 10-K filing requirements).
182. 17 C.F.R. § 232.101 (2006).
183. FORM 10-K, supra note 150, at 1.
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filing Form 10-K, they face stiff financial penalties from the SEC
and stand to lose significant credibility in the financial markets.184
Furthermore, the SEC immediately discloses Form 10-K filings to
the public, whereas the PPA permits the DOL to take up to 90 days
to process Form 5500 data before releasing them.
Although streamlined reporting solves the problem of consistent
and timely access to pension funding levels, certain information is
still missing from Form 5500. Indeed, key metrics such as termi-
nation liability are so material to the financial health of corporate
pension plans that the DOL, IRS, and PBGC should require that all
companies disclose them on Form 5500 filings.'85  Similarly,
Congress should amend section 1310 of ERISA so that government
agencies may publicly disclose information contained in 4010
filings. Taken as a whole, these improvements would provide the
public with the necessary tools to hold companies accountable for
their pension obligations.
D. Bifurcated Pension Accounting
As part of its recently announced reforms, the FASB announced
that it would move pension assets and liabilities from the footnotes
of financial statements onto the balance sheet.'86 Although such a
paradigm shift will promote the financial transparency of corporate
pension obligations, it may be overly broad in scope. Indeed, a sharp
dichotomy exists between well-run, credit-worthy companies that
will continue to operate as going concerns, and poorly managed,
undercapitalized, and financially distressed corporations that teeter
on the brink of insolvency. A bifurcated approach to reporting
underfunded pension liabilities may therefore be more appropriate.
Credit-worthy companies will continue to operate as long-term,
going concerns; their risk of insolvency in the near- to medium-term
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2000 & Supp. IV 2006) (describing penalties for late filers).
185. Under the PPA, section 1310 filings remain separate from Form 5500 and need not be
publicly disclosed. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, supra note 167, at 115; see also
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 505, 120 Stat. 780, 946.
186. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB RESPONSE TO SEC STUDY ON ARRANGEMENTS
WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY
OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 3 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/fasbresponse-secstudy-obs
.pdf ("[T]his phase seeks to improve financial reporting by requiring that the funded or unfunded
status of postretirement benefit plans, measured as the difference between the fair value of plan
assets and the benefit obligation... be recognized in the statement of financial position.").
Spring 2007] 1199
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1169
is effectively nil. Although the use of actuarial assumptions may
distort pension assets and liabilities in the near-term, over longer
periods of time, volatile swings in valuation will tend to average out
and yield relatively accurate results. Absent an Enron-like
accounting fraud fiasco, such corporations have stable enough
outlooks to adequately fund their future pension obligations.
Requiring such companies to report pension shortfalls on their
balance sheet rather than in footnotes therefore seems counter-
intuitive and unnecessary: short-term market fluctuations do not
affect the viability of such financially secure companies, and
accounting rules should not punish them for operating a successful
business.
However, as credit quality deteriorates, so too does a corpo-
ration's prospect for survival. Simultaneously, the "moral hazard"
built into current ERISA legislation becomes increasingly tempting
to companies. According to recent GAO research, corporations with
speculative credit ratings are more likely to have underfunded
pension plans and incur DRC charges.' Evidence also exists that
such companies are more likely to employ aggressive actuarial
assumptions as a means of reducing their minimum funding
requirements.'88 Most telling of all, 39 of the 41 largest plan
terminations involved companies with speculative credit ratings
immediately prior to termination.'8 9 Of these, approximately 80
percent of the corporations were speculatively rated 10 years prior to
termination.'9"
Based on such compelling data, it seems possible to interpolate a
credit-rating-based inflection point, at which time the likelihood of
"moral hazard" and insolvency places a corporation's pension plan at
imminent risk for termination.' 91  As a corporation approaches
insolvency, termination liability and the fair market value of assets
become increasingly important. At this point in time, the corporation
187. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 30.
188. Id.; see also infra fig.7.
189. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 30; see also
infra fig.7.
190. PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra note 15, at 30.
191. Although it may be tempting to define such an inflection point based upon a multi-
factorial or sliding scale test, one must remember that the credit rating itself already represents an
amalgam of synthesized financial and economic data. This note therefore proposes drawing a
bright line at a credit rating of BBB- or equivalent.
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should no longer be viewed as a long-term, viable entity. Conse-
quently, the use of actuarial methodologies to assess pension
obligations becomes grossly inadequate and obscures the corpo-
ration's true financial condition. It is under such circumstances that
a company should be required to report underfunded pension
liabilities on the balance sheet.
From a legal perspective, Congress should consider using the
same inflection point to impose a statutory freeze upon a company's
defined benefit plan. Although this would prevent employees from
accruing additional benefits, it also would provide the financially
distressed company with an opportunity to fully fund promised
retirement benefits. Furthermore, a statutory freeze would reduce the
reliance of employees upon the "false promise" of generous defined
benefit pensions and might even provide them with bargaining power
to request higher pay or an alternative defined contribution benefit
that would survive bankruptcy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note has elaborated upon the fundamental disconnect that
exists between the actual funding level of the nation's defined benefit
plans and that which public corporations are legally obligated to
report in regulatory filings. Although the defined benefit plan is no
longer the dominant pension vehicle it once was at the inception of
ERISA, it lingers within the capital structures of the nation's oldest
and largest companies and continues to play an important role in the
retirement security of millions of Americans.
The failure of Corporate America to fulfill its pension promise
stems directly from the shortcomings of ERISA and the inability of
Congress to enact an effective long-term remedy. Indeed, financial
transparency is the sine qua non for efficient capital markets to
function.'92 Yet the current disclosure requirements mandated by
ERISA, the SEC, and the FASB have failed to provide the public
with consistent, accurate, and timely information regarding the
financial health of defined benefit plans. In the late 1960s, the
spectacular failure of the Studebaker Corporation served as a catalyst
for enactment of the original ERISA legislation.'93 The UAL
192. Silverblatt, supra note 151 ("[F]or capital markets to function properly, sufficient timely
data, similar to earnings reports, are necessary.").
193. Wooten, supra note 23, at 683.
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bankruptcy may well be this generation's "focusing event," and
should serve as an impetus for Congress to enact a new, meaningful
pension reform that not only promotes financial transparency, but
also encourages corporate responsibility.
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FIGURE 2: DEFINED BENEFIT AND CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 1980-2000
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FIGURE 3: INITIAL BALANCE REQUIRED TO FUND $1000 IN 30 YEARS
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TRUE NATURE OF THE RISKS TO THE DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION SYSTEM
9 (2005), http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/pbgcdraft
092205.pdf.
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FIGURE 4: ExAMPLE OF A TIMELINE OF FORM 5500 PREPARATION FOR A
CALENDAR YEAR DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN
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FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE OF FORM 5500 BEING PROCESSED THROUGH EFAST
WITH ERRORS
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&~k,!,r 5 Extr ' Ended dmdw for ca e ar year Igan Fwrm 5500 f-iig
The fom i s unitto4. mot*1t5 the beonxinq ofpwi -j
Jsnuary 15 The Form 5500 Repot inially procesed by Jxamry I&
tf arror are ourd, a L-tr is aM os* to the ier seold" dadsktlon.
ixJh is A Net spom is sece m ed an t p~od by M3w de, if the
m iswffi to Corec the e wcof Aw
is st'rlh to the Idex
Mwy 14 The second Ome response is recewed wtd processed by 06t date
TMe Mring h1 maried as acnripe. repardess df whether th*emto
has beeni teschme
Jtme 30 EFAST presrng of 2000 jtsr year tems ofliosily douea
Note: The processing cycle remains open for two years to account for all
filings, including non-calendar year filings that may be due up to a year
after the filings used in the above example.
Source: FORM 5500 PENSION INFORMATION, supra note 20, at 32,
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0549l.pdf.
Spring 2007] SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND ERISA
FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE EXPECTED RATES OF RETURN
REPORTED IN FORM 5500 SCHEDULE B AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR A SAMPLE OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES
Averg pca te m,, retur
91%
Imll I M I IIIII M o II9IIIII9I Is 24W 2W 2MI
Note: Companies in this sample were all listed in the 2003 Fortune 500.
Data from Form 5500 reports for 2002 were not fully available at the
time of this analysis.
iSource: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS, supra note 20, at 16.
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FIGURE 7: OVER 80 PERCENT OF SPONSORS ASSOCIATED WITH PBGC's
LARGEST TERMINATION CLAIMS HAD SPECULATIVE GRADE CREDIT
RATINGS 10 YEARS PRIOR TO TERMINATION
P"."ct %4 at poon "U040.0 WMf PSGCrges Mt M"t
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Note: Based on 41 of PBGC's largest gross claims in which the rating of
the sponsor was known, representing over 67 percent of total gross claims
from 1975-2004. These 41 claims may include sponsors with more than
one plan and are not limited to those plans in the GAO sample. Ratings
based on S&P rating._
Source: PRIVATE PENSIONS: WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES, supra
note 15, at 36.
